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DEFROSTING THE ALYESKA CHILL: THE FUTURE OF 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AWARDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
LITIGATION 
Philip M. Cedar* 
In recent years the American public has become a significant 
force in pressing for environmental protection. Because access to 
Congressional and administrative policy decisions is often limited 
by cost to regulated commercial and industrial interests, individual 
citizens and public interest groups have opted for the more expedi-
tious route of bringing law suits directly against violators of federal 
pollution standards and challenging administrative decisions which 
allegedly fail to comply with environmental protection and policy 
legislation. 1 
Despite serious economic obstacles, these citizen suits have as-
sumed a well-recognized watchdog function. Such public interest 
environmental litigation has helped to fill the interstices created by 
inadequate enforcement resources in those agencies charged with 
the administration of environmental legislation. Citizen suits at-
tempting to enforce Congressional mandates have received the ap-
proval of all branches of the federal government.2 
* Staff Member, ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
I See, e.g., Clean Air Amendments of 1970,42 U.S.C. § 1857(a) et seq. (1970); National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970) (hereinafter cited as 
NEPA). 
2 In his August 1971, "Message to Congress," President Nixon stated: 
My confidence that our Nation will meet its environmental problems in the years ahead 
is based in large measure on my faith in the continued vigilance of American public 
opinion and in the continued vitality of citizen efforts to protect and improve the environ-
ment. The National Environmental Policy Act has given new dimension to citizen partici-
pation and citizen rights-as is evidenced by the numerous court actions through which 
individuals and groups have made their voices heard. 
7 WEEKLY COMPo OF PRES. Doc. 1132, 1133 (1971). 
The President's executive agency, created by NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1970), pointed out 
in its Second Annual Report that citizen litigation has: 
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The increased incidence of such suits can be attributed, in large 
part, to statutorily authorized and judicially created awards of at-
torneys' fees to the public interest plaintiff. "Fee-shifting," as this 
development has been termed, has induced citizens and non-profit 
public interest organizations to undertake complex litigation chal-
lenging agency determinations, as well as private corporate actions 
which have allegedly failed to comport with environmental protec-
tion statutes. Congressional authorization of fee awards against gov-
ernment defendants3 and private defendants reflects a recognition 
of the inadequate financial support available to public interest 
plaintiffs. 
The courts in the exercise of their equity powers have fashioned 
several exceptions to the "American Rule," which dictates that all 
litigants are responsible for their own attorneys' fees. The primary 
equitable exception, which greatly encouraged civil rights and envi-
ronmental litigation, was based on the private attorney general 
theory. The rationale for this theory, as adopted and expanded by 
the lower federal courts, was that a public interest plaintiff, whose 
suit effectuated strong Congressional policies and benefited the 
public at large or broad segments of society, acted in essence as a 
private attorney general and was therefore entitled to collect attor-
... speeded up court definition of what is required of federal agencies under environmen-
tal protection statutes. The suits have forced greater sensitivity in both government and 
industry to environmental considerations. And they have educated lawmakers and the 
public to the need for new environmental legislation. 
U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 
155-56 (1971). But see Cramton & Boyer, Citizen Suits in the Environmental Field: Peril or 
Promise? 2 ECOL. L.Q. 407, 409 (1972), which asserted that the creation of private rights to 
sue for environmental protection were" ... neither philosophically sound nor carefully 
drafted," and thus gave a very guarded approval to such suits. 
Legislative sanction is reflected in the various provisions authorizing such suits. E.g. Clean 
Air Amendments of 1970 § 304(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1970) (authorizing citizen suits 
against any private or government violator); [d. § 307(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b) (directing 
petitions for review of specified actions of the Administrator to the United States Courts of 
Appeals). 
Judicial approval is traceable to statements acknowledging the beneficial effects of such 
litigation. For instance, Judge Bazelon recently noted in Natural Resources Defense Council 
v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351, 1358 (D.C.Cir. 1975): "These suits have opened the Administrator's 
actions to judicial scrutiny from a point of view widely divergent from that represented by 
the regulated interests, and their positions have frequently been upheld." 
" The statutory provisions authorizing fee awards against the government are important 
exceptions to the application of the sovereign immunity doctrine to the taxation of costs and 
fees. In the absence of specific legislation providing otherwise, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970) 
prohibits fee awards. Awards against state defendants may be barred by the concept of 
sovereign immunity as embodied in the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, U.S. CONST. amend. XI. See text at notes 82-100 infra for further explication of the effect 
of sovereign immunity on the awards of attorneys' fees. 
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neys' fees from the defendant. 4 An award based on this theory was 
further recognition of the private enforcement potential of such suits 
and the development of an effective means of mitigating the dispar-
ity of resources between public interest plaintiffs and the typical 
government or corporate defendant. 
Notwithstanding the broad acceptance of this exception, the pos-
sibility of subjective judicial determinations as to which Congres-
sional or public policies were deserving of fee award incentives, and 
the confusion attendant upon such selections, led the Supreme 
Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service Company v. Wilderness Society" 
to decisively foreclose fee awards based on the private attorney 
general rationale. The Court held that, in the absence of express 
statutory authorization for the granting of attorneys' fees, federal 
courts may exercise their equitable powers to allow counsel fees in 
only a limited class of cases.6 
This dramatic halt in the development of court awarded attor-
neys' fees has shifted the burden to Congress to select those areas 
of public interest litigation which merit or require the inducement 
of fee-shifting. Congress has in fact acknowledged the task. 7 The 
process of selection, however, is replete with difficult choices as to 
what constitutes the "public interest" and between the strong com-
peting interests operative in environmental controversies. Managea-
ble standards for regulating judicial discretion must be developed 
to prevent subjective policy preferences from becoming the bench-
marks in granting or denying attorneys' fees. The appropriate 
choices must inevitably be based upon careful analysis of the opera-
tion of statutory and judicially created awards to date. 
This article will focus on the development of fee-shifting in an 
attempt to clearly define the problems confronting Congress in its 
forthcoming response to Alyeska. A brief discussion of the economic 
constraints involved in environmental litigation will set the frame-
work for the legal analysis that follows. After an historical overview 
of the place of fee-shifting in American jurisprudence, recent statu-
tory and judicial treatment of this development will be examined. 
Finally, the reasoning of the Court in Alyeska will be critically ana-
• See, e.g., La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Alyeskal. 
, Id. at 269. The Court approved of the longstanding exceptions for a litigant's bad faith 
or where a judgment results in the creation of a common fund. See text at notes 101-112 infra 
for a discussion of these exceptions. 
7 Witt, After Alyeska: Can the Contender Survive? JURIS DOCTOR, October 1975, 34, 40-41; 
Goldfarb, In the Public Interest, Washington Post, June 11, 1975, at AlB, col. 4. 
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lyzed. The author contends that although the Court correctly termi-
nated the common law usage of the private attorney general ra-
tionale, legislatively created fee awards under this theory remain 
the most viable method of financing private enforcement suits. 
I. ECONOMIC OBSTACLES TO ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 
Basic to an understanding of the rationale supporting fee-shifting 
is a sense of the economic barriers inherent in the complex process 
of private enforcement of environmental statutes. The successful 
environmental plaintiff must overcome significant obstacles. Fore-
most among the barriers is the inequality of means between the 
public interest plaintiff and the government or industrial defen-
dant.8 That most environmental suits seek injunctive relief rather 
than monetary damages makes difficult the procurement of vigor-
ous and competent representation for the public interest plaintiff.9 
The typical plaintiff in these suits, an ad hoc citizens group or 
standing public interest organization,IO cannot look to an award of 
money damages to pay the expenses of the litigation but must rely 
primarily on the charity of local attorneys or limited grants from 
foundations to fund these court battles. 11 The government, relative 
• See Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administra-
tive Law, 70 COLUM. L_ REV. 612, 618 (1970). The imbalance of resources may be exacerbated 
where, in a suit against the government, a private company intervenes to protect its interest 
in relaxed enforcement of environmental safeguards. The Alyeska case, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), 
dramatically illustrates this problem. There, a: consortium of seven major oil companies 
intervened to support the Secretary of the Interior's initial approval of the proposed trans-
Alaskan pipeline. 
• The absence of a potential contingent fee arrangement has dissuaded the private bar from 
becoming involved in public interest litigation. See generally, Note, The Private Bar, the 
Public Interest and Tax Incentives: Monetary Motivation for Action, 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 953 
(1971). 
,. Among the more prominent environmental interest groups are the Sierra Club, Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Environmental Defense Fund, the Appalachian Mountain Club 
and the Wilderness Society. Another similar source of legal resources and manpower in 
environmental litigation is the Center for Law and Social Policy. For a description of the 
Center's activities, see Halperin & Cunningham, Reflections on the New Public Interest Law: 
Theory and Practice at the Center for Law and Social Policy, 59 GEO. L.J. 1095 (1971). 
" Foundation grants cannot be viewed as a long-term, consistent source of funding. While 
these grants have supported public interest law firms and national organizations, the grantors 
have perceived the funds as "seed money." See Berlin, Roisman & Kessler, Public Interest 
Law, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 675, 686-87 (1970). Even assuming a willingness to continue 
funding these groups, foundations, as institutional investors subject to fluctuation in stock-
market conditions, may have a difficult time living up to their funding commitments. Neither 
can such grants be assumed to come with no strings attached. Foundations may place implicit 
or explicit conditions on the grantee's activities and use of such funds. Halperin & Cun-
ningham, supra note 10, at 1112. 
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to these plaintiffs, has virtually unlimited legal resources. 12 The 
industrial defendant or intervenor will allocate funds for legal serv-
ices commensurate with the potential source of profit to be derived 
from relaxed environmental standards. In addition, the corporate 
party to the litigation will receive a tax deduction for expenses 
incurred for such business-related lawsuits. 13 
While the lack of adequate funding is shared by public interest 
litigators in other areas,14 environmental lawsuits demand an addi-
tional measure of expertise in non-legal matters. Scientific data 
must be gathered, analyzed and presented in order to demonstrate 
the adverse environmental consequences of the· private or agency 
project being challenged. 15 Successful prosecution of an environ-
mental lawsuit therefore requires either retaining experts or at least 
engaging in the costly process of taking extensive depositions. Typi-
cally, the litigation and appeal will extend for several years.16 Con-
tinuation of the litigation depletes the already meager resources of 
the plaintiffl7 and precludes it from participating in other potential 
lawsuits. 
12 Hearings on Attorneys Fees Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interest 
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. at 791 (1973) (testimony of J. 
Anthony Kline, Esq.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. 
1:\ Federal income tax law permits business corporations to deduct the cost of such litigation 
from taxable income. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a). C{. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 
687 (1966). Since the present corporate income tax rate is approximately 48%, in essence, the 
federal government is contributing almost one-half of the private defendants' legal expenses. 
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 11. 
II Civil rights organizations suffer from the same funding deficiency. Legal services organi-
zations, although principally funded through direct governmental assistance, are in a similar 
position, particularly in areas where "test cases" are required. See generally McLaughlin, The 
Recovery of Attorney's Fees: A New Method of Financing Legal Services, 40 FORD. L. REV. 
761 (1972). 
" Hearings, supra note 12, at 837 (testimony of Dennis Flannery, Esq.). 
" The Alyeska litigation, which culminated in the Supreme Court's decision of May 12, 
1975, 421 U.S. 240, was initiated by the Wilderness Society on March 26, 1970 in a suit to 
enjoin the construction of the trans-Alaskan Pipeline. Wilderness Society v. Hickel, 325 F. 
Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970). The appeal on the merits of this suit was finally concluded by the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on February 9, 1973. See 
Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973). 
17 Note that the public interest intervenors in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 
354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966), a case which is recognized as 
one of the leading standing decisions, required a last minute gift from a reluctant foundation 
in order to participate in the appeal to the Second Circuit. Sive, The Functions and Features 
of Private Litigation in the Growth of Environmental Law, TRANSCRIPT OF THE SPEECHES, 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 58 (November 1970). Protracted litigation is 
not without adverse consequences for the defendants and the public. E.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 
6, 1974, sec. 1, p. 53, col. 2, cited in W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 185 n.3: 
Consolidated Edison officials noted that the hydroelectric project being challenged in the 
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II. AMERICAN REJECTION OF THE ENGLISH SYSTEM OF INDEMNITY 
Fee-shifting, or "indemnity," as some have termed it, 18 is not new 
to Anglo-American jurisprudence. For centuries the English have 
allowed counsel fees as a part of the award assessed against unsuc-
cessfullitigants. 18 The chancellor in equity was recognized as always 
having the discretionary power to award fees to the prevailing 
party.20 Statutorily based awards in the law courts have been a part 
of the English system since 1267.21 For the last one hundred years, 
judges at law have also been invested with the power to award fees 
in their discretion. 22 The English system of fee awards, however, 
failed to take root in America. The American system of requiring 
each party to finance its own legal representation is virtually 
unique.23 
Several arguments advanced in support of the American Rule 
warrant consideration. The Supreme Court, as an important advo-
cate of the American system of fee awards,24 posited the theory that 
the poor might be "unjustly discouraged" from instituting actions 
Scenic Hudson case, as originally proposed, would have cost $165 million, but after the 
inflationary effects of the delay engendered by the court action estimates were as high as $500 
million. 
,. Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-examination of the Indemnity System, 55 IOWA L. REV. 
26 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Mause]. 
" See generally, Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929). 
20 Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301, 312 
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Nussbaum]; Goodhart, supra note 19, at 852-54. 
21 Statute of Marlborough, 52 Hen. 111, c. 6 (1267) (authorizing fee awards to the prevailing 
tenant-defendant in certain actions maliciously brought by a landlord). 2 F. POLLOCK & F. 
MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 597 n.6 (2d ed. 1909). See Nussbaum, supra note 20, at 
312-13, for a concise history of statutory fee swards. 
%! In 1875, the Rules of Court altered the established tradition of awarding fees as of right 
to grant such awards in the discretion of the court. Order 55 of the Rules of Court, attached 
as First Schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 38 Vict., c. 77 (1875). 
23 See generally, REPORT OF THE COMM1'ITEE ON COMPARATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, PRO-
CEEDINGS ABA INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW SECTION 117-24 (1963); REpORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE, PROCEEDINGS ABA INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARA-
TIVE LAW SECTION 125 (1952). Conflicting explanations for this aberration have been offered 
by several commentators. See, e.g., Goodhart, supra note 19, at 873 (since lawyers were held 
in suspicion during the early years of America's development, the courts did not want to 
encourage the use of attorneys by awarding fees); Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel 
Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 792, 798-99 (1966) ("accidental statutory 
history"); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of 
Damages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619, 641-42 (1931) (individualistic spirit of the frontier years 
demanded each party bear his own costs) . 
.. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796) (the inclusion of attorneys' fees 
in a damage award was reversed because "(t)he general practice of the United States is in 
opposition to it"). Acceptance of the American system was recently reaffirmed in Alyeska, 
421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
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to vindicate their rights, if, in losing, they would be saddled with 
liability for the fees of their opponent's counsel,25 Another argument 
commonly advanced is that an individual with a small damage 
claim will be discouraged from bringing suit, if the possibility exists 
that defendant's attorney's fees, which might exceed the value of 
the claim, would be taxed against him.28 Similarly, a defendant 
faced with a small claim might be induced to capitulate, notwith-
standing a legitimate defense, so as to avoid the additional liability 
for plaintiff's counsel fees. 27 
The Supreme Court has also noted "the expense and difficulty" 
inherent in litigating the amount of the fee to be awarded. 28 This 
fear that the post-litigation determination of fees will create an 
undue burden on the courts is not shared uniformly. Congressional 
authorization of fee-shifting29 indicates at least a provisionallegisla-
tive finding that this mechanism for effectuating certain articulated 
policies is both appropriate and manageable. Moreover, the lower 
federal courts, upon whom this "burden" falls, have not been reluc-
tant to award fees. 30 Whatever "difficulty" is created by grafting 
such hearings onto a lawsuit is attributable not to the institution of 
fee-shifting, but instead to the lack of workable standards for setting 
the award. In the absence of such standards, the disparity in per 
hour rate or in the size of the overall fee31 may have a significant 
effect on a public interest plaintiff's decision to litigate. The lack 
of uniformity and resultant confusion in the fee hearings does not 
necessarily condemn the indemnity system, but rather calls out for 
legislative guidance for determining the size of the fee. 
Several commentators have advocated wholesale adoption of the 
", Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) [hereinafter 
cited as Fleischmann]. 
,. Wilderness Society v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1974) [hereinafter cited 
as Wilderness Society]. 
27 [d. at 1032. 
" Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718. See also Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 231 
(1872): ". . . this grafted litigation might possibly be more animated and protracted than 
that in the original cause." 
,. See, e.g., Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970). See 
text at notes 38-81 infra, for an analysis of legislated exceptions to the American Rule. 
a" Wilderness Society, 495 F.2d at 1031 n.1. See text at notes 140-163 infra, for a discussion 
of the tremendous increase in fee awards in the public interest prior to Alyeska, 421 U.S. 240 
(1975). 
a, Compare Wilderness Society, 495 F.2d at 1037 (1974) with Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. 
Supp. 387, 410 (M.C. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part sub. nom., Wyat v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 
1305 (5th Cir. 1974) and Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1339 
(1st Cir. 1973). 
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"English Rule."32 Some contend that under the indemnity system, 
which "raises the stakes"33 to include additional liability for fees, 
litigants are encouraged to settle out of court.34 Plaintiffs are said 
to be less likely to bring nuisance suits, defendants less apt to inter-
pose frivolous defenses. 35 Plaintiffs who mistakenly believe their 
claim is meritorious will not hesitate to litigate, however, nor will 
defendants who assume the same. In fact, fee-shifting under the 
English Rule may provide a positive incentive to litigate. Thus, the 
same characteristics which can be argued for repudiation of the 
American Rule, can also be cited by opponents of a system of univ-
eral indemnity. Absent statistical evidence demonstrating the posi-
tive effects of an indemnity system on court congestion and on the 
goal of equalizing access to the courts, mere speculation as to behav-
ioral changes among litigants does not provide a sufficient basis for 
adoption of the English Rule. 36 In this context, total abandonment 
of the American Rule would appear to be ill-advised. 
Adoption of a pure indemnity system would have dire conse-
quences for the poor or public interest plaintiff. A disadvantaged 
litigant seeking to vindicate his or her rights through injunctive or 
declaratory relief may well be discouraged not only by the absence 
of a monetary award but also by the possibility of having to defray 
counsel fees for both parties. With the premium which the English 
Rule places on predictability of outcome, "test cases" in developing 
areas of the law or in areas where the precedents are uncertain are 
likely to be discouraged.37 Environmental suits would therefore de-
crease in view of the emergent nature of that area of the law. The 
32 E.g., Ehrenzweig, supra note 23, at 793; McCormick, supra note 23, at 643; Goodhart, 
supra note 19, at 877. For an excellent analysis of the various arguments both for and against 
the adoption of the English Rule, see, Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal 
Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636,648-55 (1974). 
33 Wilderness Society, 495 F.2d at 1032. 
" See Geller, Unreasonable Refusal to Settle and Calendar Congestion-Suggested 
Remedy, 1962 PROCEEDINGS OF ABA SECTION ON INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 134 135 
(1963). But see Mause, supra note 18, at 31 (indemnity would discourage pre-trial settlem'ents 
by encouraging plaintiff's to demand more). Comment, Liability for Attorney's Fees in the 
Federal Courts-The Private Attorney General Exception, 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 201, 
204-05 (1975). 
35 See Mause, supra note 18, at 38. Professor Mause, in his preliminary behavioral analysis 
of litigants under both systems, concluded that without more specific data the impact of 
indemnity on the incidence of litigation was impossible to determine. 
" One practitioner went so far as to say the operation of a universal indemnity system 
would be unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment right to litigate federal 
issues. Hearings, supra note 12, at 854 (testimony of Joseph Onek, Esq.). See N.A.A.C.P. v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964). 
37 Mause, supra note 18, at 41. 
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element of mutuality of indemnity which characterizes the English 
system is thus inappropriate where the purpose of the fee award is 
to encourage legitimate suits by disadvantaged persons and citizen 
suits as a private law enforcement mechanism. 
III. STATUTORY INFLUENCES ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF ATTORNEYS' 
FEES 
A. Statutory Exceptions to the American Rule 
The initial Congressional stance with respect to awarding 
attorneys' fees was to permit a federal court to follow the practice 
of the courts of the state where it sat.3S Despite the subsequent 
expiration of legislative authorization to follow state rule, the prac-
tice continued until 1853 when Congress attempted to standardize 
the costs and fees allowable in federal litigation.3D In 1853, legisla-
tion was passed which prescribed a limited number of items to be 
allowed as taxable costs. 40 Among the goals of the Act was the pre-
clusion of abuses in the practice of fee-shifting which had at times 
led to exhorbitant awards being taxed against the losing litigantY 
In order to achieve this goal, Congress expressly defined those few 
instances in which counsel fees would be collectible from the losing 
party and provided that no other compensation was permissible.42 
This statute has been carried forward by Congress and is presently 
embodied in sections of the Judicial Code of 1948.43 Under these 
sections, a court may tax as costs only attorneys' docket fees in a 
narrow range of cases.44 
This apparent Congressional acceptance of the American Rule 
has been tempered by the recent enactment of statutory fee-shifting 
provisions which seek to encourage private enforcement of the poli-
'1M Act of September 29, 1789, 1 Stat. 93-94, c. 21 § 2; Act of March 1, 1793, 1 Stat. 333, c. 
20 § 4. District courts sitting in admiralty or maritime jurisdiction were to follow a specific 
fee schedule. [d. at 332, c. 20 § 1. These enactments expired prior to 1800 leaving the federal 
courts without express legislative guidance for over 50 years. For a concise history of the 
relevant legislation from the early enactments through the mid-twentieth century, see 
Alyeska, 421 U.S. 240, 247-55 (1975) and authorities cited therein. 
:I. Legislation in 1842 gave the Supreme Court authority to regulate costs and fees, but the 
Court took no action under this statute. Act of August 23, 1842,5 Stat. 518, c. 188 § 7. See 
Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 250-51. 
'" Act of February 26, 1853, 10 Stat. 161, c. 80 § 1. 
" Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 251 n.24 (citing the remarks of Sen. Bradbury, Congo Globe App., 
32d Cong., 2d Sess. 207 (1853)). 
" Act of February 26, 1853, 10 Stat. 161-63. 
" 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1923(a) (1970). 
u 28 U.S.C. § 1923(a) (1970). 
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cies articulated therein. These fee provisions are premised primar-
ily45 on the recognition that economic barriers hinder the effectua-
tion of Congressional policies through private litigation. 46 The 
statutory allowances differ both in scope and form. The nature of 
the legislative mandate varies from allowing awards in "exceptional 
cases"47 to granting awards to any party "whenever the court deter-
mines such award is appropriate."48 The provisions, however, may 
be broken down into those which allow awards in the discretion of 
the court49 and those which require the court to award fees to the 
prevailing plaintiff. 50 
A significant proportion of the recently enacted environmental 
protection statutes contain fee-shifting provisions.51 In specifically 
providing for a private right of action under the statutes, Congress 
evidently acknowledged that private enforcement was necessary to 
effectuate important environmental policies. Moreover, to mitigate 
the deterrent to private suits under the statutes posed by the cost 
of legal representation, broad discretionary fee-shifting sections 
were adopted. The rationale supporting the provisions, as enunci-
" While the legislative histories do not clearly indicate a punitive rationale, such a theory 
may well have supported inclusion of a fee-shifting provision in certain statutes. E.g., Clayton 
Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (mandatory taxing of fees against an antitrust violator in 
addition to the treble damage provision in the same section). In Newman v. Piggie Park 
Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Piggie Park, the Supreme 
Court recognized dual support for an attorney fee provision in Title II of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 20ooa-3(b) (1970): 
Congress therefore enacted the provision for counsel fees-not simply to penalize litigants 
who deliberately advance arguments they know to be untenable but, more broadly, to 
encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial reliefimder Title 
II . 
.. See, e.g., the Senate Report to the Amendments to Freedom of Information Act, Pub. 
L. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 § l(b)(2) (Nov. 21, 1974) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a» in which it 
was stated: "the necessity to bear attorneys' fees can thus present barriers to the effective 
implementation of national policies expressed by Congress in legislation." S. REP. No. 854, 
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1974) . 
., E.g., Act of July 19, 1952 c.950, 66 Stat. 813, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1970) (patent infringe-
ment). 
" E.g., Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. §1857h-2(d)(1970) . 
.. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act of 1968,42 U.S.C. § 3612(c)(1970); Securities Act of 1933, 15 
U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970); Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) 
(1970). 
'0 See, e.g., Perishable Agriculture Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b) (1970); Truth in 
Lending Act § 130, 15 U.S.C. 1640(a) (1970); Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 206 
(1970). 
" Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970); Noise Control 
Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (Supp. II 1972); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972,33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (Supp.1I 1972); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctu-
aries Act of 1972, § 105(d)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (Supp. II 1972). 
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ated by the Senate Committee Report for the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972, was that citizens bringing 
legitimate actions under the acts would be "performing a public 
service and in such instances the courts should award costs of litiga-
tion to such party."52 The Committee further indicated a desire to 
extend permissible awards to plaintiffs in actions which cause an 
abatement of a violation before a verdict is issued.53 Thus ultimate 
success in a citizen's suit was not intended to be a prerequisite to 
an award. 
The discretion afforded the trial courts in awarding attorneys' 
fees under these statutes may be utilized to discourage abuse of the 
citizen suit provisions. The legislative history ofthe Water Pollution 
Control Act suggests that the discretion was engendered by fears 
that the citizen suit provision would be used to bring "frivolous or 
harassing actions."54 This discretionary power may also be viewed 
as authorizing an award in favor of the defendants where the litiga-
tion is deemed frivolous by the trial judge. 
The discretionary nature of the legislative mandate, however, 
necessarily militates against consistency in judicial construction of 
fee-shifting provisions in environmental legislation. 55 A liberal 
stance with respect to these provisions was illustrated by Citizens 
Association of Georgetown u. Washington,56 in which the court 
awarded attorneys' fees to the public interest plaintiffs, in spite of 
its dismissal of the suit for failure to establish the alleged violation 
of emissions standards under the Clean Air Act.57 The court predi-
cated the award upon what it considered the "plain meaning" of the 
52 s. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1972). See also S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 
2d Sess. 65 (1970) (Clean Air Amendments). 
0:' [d. 
" [d. Concern over the institution of harassing suits and the burden on the courts resulting 
from a flood of citizens suits are not commonly held by the judiciary. Cf. Office of Communi-
cation of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1006 (D.C.Cir. 1966) (agency fears 
of inundation of their processes are rarely borne out); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. 
FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 617 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (" ... the expense 
and vexation of legal proceedings is not lightly undertaken."). 
" This result remains true despite the Supreme Court's guidance offered in Piggie Park, 
390 U.S. at 402, where the Court held that a fee-shifting provision in Title II of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970), was to be followed in successful suits under 
that Title "unless special circumstances would render the award unjust." [d. at 402. The 
Court's construction of the provision in Piggie Park, albeit in a civil rights context, should 
have defined the scope of discretion afforded trial courts in applying discretionary fee-shifting 
provisions contained in other statutes; however, few courts have looked to the case for guid-
ance in exercising their discretion. 
" 383 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1974). 
57 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (1970). 
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fee provision in the Act, which indicated awards could be made 
irrespective of the success of the plaintiff in establishing a violation 
under the Act. 58 
Similar considerations entertained by the court in Delaware Citi-
zens for Clean Air u. Stauffer Chemical Company59 produced a con-
flicting result. In Stauffer Chemical, a citizens group brought suit 
against the corporation charging that its sulfur dioxide emissions 
were in violation of the Clean Air Act. The suit was dismissed on 
the grounds that the Administrator of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) was contemporaneously considering the propriety of 
a state-granted variance to permit Stauffer more time to construct 
the required emissions control facility. The court denied the re-
quested award of attorneys' fees, noting that providing "added in-
centive" for the institution of citizen suits was inappropriate when 
the Administrator was engaged in review of a state initiated revision 
to its air quality control plan.80 While recognizing the postive contri-
butions of citizen suits to the effective enforcement of emissions 
standards, the court was unable to find a "compelling equity" in 
favor of the plaintiff to support an award.81 
In contrast to the reasoned approaches in these cases, the district 
court in Colorado Public Interest Research Group u. Train62 
summarily dismissed plaintiff's motion for a fee award under the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act.63 The action, which sought to 
compel the EPA Administrator to take supervisory control under 
the Act of discharges of radioactive material into navigable waters, 
was dismissed on the basis of federal regulations which placed the 
power plant in issue under the jurisdiction of the Atomic Energy 
Commission. The court rejected plaintiff's contention that a fee 
award was permitted by the Act even where the government pre-
vailed. The district court judge noted that this contention went 
"somewhat against my training and experience as a lawyer pos-
,. 383 F. Supp. at 144. This interpretation comports with the legislative history of the Act. 
The Senate Committee Report stated: H(t)he court may award costs of litigation to either 
party whenever the court determines such award is in the public interest without regard to 
the outcome of the litigation." S. REp. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1970) . 
.. 62 F.R.D. 353 (D. Del. 1974). 
0" 1d. at 357. 
" 1d. 
'2 373 F. Supp. 991 (D. Colo.), rev'd on other grounds, 507 F.2d 743, 749 (10th Cir. 1974), 
cert. granted, 421 U.S. 998 (1975). The Tenth Circuit did not address itself to the attorneys' 
fees question and the Supreme Court is not expected to pass on this issue. See 43 U.S.L.W. 
3032 (U.S. 1975) (questions presented) . 
• 3 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (Supp. II 1972). 
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sessed of much experience in losing contingent fee cases."64 Without 
reference to the wording of the statute or the legislative history, the 
court found it inappropriate that the suit should be "subsidized 
with taxpayers' money."65 
These cases present important questions as to the breadth of Con-
gressional policy supporting fee awards: Should this discretionary 
power invested in the federal district courts be exercised whenever 
an important environmental issue is brought out or clarified by a 
public interest suit? Once plaintiff's good faith is established, 
should counsel fees be awarded automatically irrespective of the 
ultimate outcome of the suit? Does Congressional intent to acceler-
ate enforcement of environmental legislation extend so far as award-
ing fees in any non-frivolous citizens suit? Unfortunately, the legis-
lative history provides little guidance for the trial court in exercising 
its judgment relative to these questions. 
Stauffer Chemical apparently stands for the proposition that the 
discretionary fee-shifting provisions authorize a balancing of the 
equities as assessed by the court. Although judicial flexibility in 
allowing awards may contribute to the just application of this rem-
edy to individual cases, the latitude afforded the lower courts may 
produce an unhealthy disparity among the courts and may permit 
arbitrary denials of awards to frustrate an articulated Congressional 
policy. The dissimilarity in construction of the statutes destroys the 
predictability upon which litigants base their strategies. This factor 
is of particular salience where the very ability to fund the litigation 
is based on the potential of an award of counsel fees. Broad discre-
tion, without statutory language to provide benchmarks for the 
courts, may result in the granting or denying of awards based upon 
the subjective policy preferences66 or upon the predisposition of the 
judge against Congressional authorization of fee-shifting, as exem-
plified by Colorado PIRG. Nevertheless, the extent to which the 
discretionary provisions disserve the policy behind the encourage-
ment of citizen suits through fee-shifting is presently unclear, and 
requires the attention of Congress prior to the enactment of similar 
provisions in other environmental statutes. 
Another important deficiency in the Congressional response to the 
.. 373 F. Supp. at 995. 
" [d. 
" See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 266 n.39 (1975), where the Court expressly disapproved of 
latitude accorded judges under the private attorney general rationale and noted the possibil-
ity of selective application of substantive law priorities and preferences. 
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recognized need for encouraging private enforcement is the lack of 
consistency among the statutes addressed to environmental prob-
lems. Whether produced merely by the ad hoc nature of Congres-
sional determinations fostered primarily by the committee system, 
or by a genuine failure to achieve a consensus as to the need for 
supplementary citizen action, citizen suit and fee-shifting provi-
sions are noticeably absent in legislation, such as the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA),87 which embodies significant envi-
ronmental policy statements and mandates consideration of the 
ecological consequences of major projects.88 Additionally, certain 
environmental statutes lack internal consistency with respect to the 
award of attorneys' fees. 8u The legislative histories of such acts pro-
vide little insight into the basis for Congressional preference.7o What 
has thus emerged is a crazy quilt of provisions which defies rational 
explanation. 
A dramatic example of the failure to achieve a modicum of con-
sistency within a statute is represented by the fee-shifting provi-
sions in the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. The Act specifically 
permits suits under § 304 in the district courts in the form of manda-
mus and confers upon the courts the power to issue appropriate 
relief. 7I Section 307 grants jurisdiction to the courts of appeals to 
review specified actions by the Environmental Protection Agency 
Administrator.72 Notwithstanding Congressional approval of citizen 
suits under the Act,73 only § 304 accords the power to award attor-
neys' fees. 74 The unexplained absence of a fee-shifting arrangement 
in actions initiated in the courts of appeals has given rise to conflict-
ing interpretations of these sections of the Act. In two cases, both 
., 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970) . 
•• See also, Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(0 (1970); Federal Aid 
Highway Act of 1970, 23 U.S.C. § 109(h) (1970) . 
.. See, e.g., Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (1970). See text at 
notes 71-81, infra, for a discussion of this. inconsistency. 
'" This absence of consistency also characterizes the treatment of fee awards in civil rights 
legislation. Compare the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq. (1970) 
(no fee-shifting provisions) with Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II and VII, 42 U .S.C. §§ 2000a-
3(b), 2000e-5(k) (discretionary authority to award fees). The failure to provide fee awards 
under the Reconstruction statutes may be in part explained by their enactment before Con-
gressional recognition of the potential inducement to citizen redress in the courts which fee-
shifting represents. The historical explanation is, however, inapposite with regard to environ-
mental legislation in that the relevant statutes are of recent vintage. 
71 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1970). 
72 [d. § 1857h-5(b). 
73 See text at notes 51-53, supra. 
" Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970). 
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entitled Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency,75 the courts were confronted with actions brought 
against the EPA under § 307, by public interest plaintiffs who 
sought to challenge the sufficiency of state air pollution control 
plans approved by the Agency. The First Circuit in NRDC I issued 
an order favorable to the plaintiff; the claim in NRDC II was satis-
fied by the agency's voluntary capitulation on the merits, while the 
appeal was pending before the District of Columbia Circuit Court 
of Appeals. The successful plaintiffs in each case subsequently filed 
a motion for an award of attorneys' fees. 
The court in NRDC I rejected the contention that the absence of 
a fee-shifting clause in § 307, coupled with express allowance for 
awards of fees under § 304, required an inference that Congress 
deliberately chose to exclude such a remedy for actions initiated in 
the courts of appeals. 78 The First Circuit noted that the availability 
of attorneys' fees should not depend upon the forum of the suit nor 
should remedies in such cases be limited to the express language of 
the particular section.77 It held, based upon the approval of fee-
shifting in the legislative history and the wording of § 304, that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to the benefits of that provision.78 
In contrast, the District of Columbia Circuit in NRDC II reluc-
tantly declined to follow the First Circuit's interpretation. The 
NRDC II court found that the sections "contemplated distinct 
groups of cases" for which the remedies were not interchangeable.79 
While emphasizing the absence of a sound policy for denying the 
availability of fees under § 307 and noting the temptation to follow 
the First Circuit, the court declined to grant counsel fees for fear 
that the award would "strain the limits" of its "interpretive func-
tion. "80 
75 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973) 
[hereinafter cited as NRDC 1]. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 512 F.2d 
1351 (D.C. Cir. 1975) [hereinafter cited as NRDC II]. 
18 NRDC 1,484 F.2d at 1336 n.6. 
77 Id. at 1336. The court relied on Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973) and Mills v. Electric 
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). See text at notes 129-37 infra for a discussion of these 
cases. On the judicial treatment of remedies available under §§ 304 and 307, compare Sierra 
Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 4 ERC 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd by 
an equally divided Court sub. nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973) with Anaconda 
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973). 
" NRDC 1,484 F.2d at 1338. 
79 NRDC II, 512 F.2d at 1355. 
'" Id. at 1357. But see NRDC II, 512 F.2d at 1361 (Wright, J., dissenting) wherein the judge 
asserted that § 304 should be read broadly particularly in light of the impossibility of award-
ing fees on other theories as mandated by Alyeska. 
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The pitfalls inherent in such inconsistency in statutory mandate 
in addition to unenlightening legislative history dilutes the desired 
encouragement to private enforcement which fee-shifting provides. 
The court in NRDC II was not unmindful of the anomalous result 
engendered by the inconsistency within the Clean Air Amendments 
and accordingly suggested several options to Congress to rectify the 
problem.sl One obvious cure, as suggested by the District of Colum-
bia Circuit, would be to extend the scope of § 304 to include actions 
brought in the courts of appeals. In treating this example of internal 
statutory contradiction, Congress should be aware that it indicates 
a failure to establish a rational scheme of fee-shifting sections in 
environmental statutes such that litigants and judges may have 
sufficient guidance. 
B. A Statutory Obstacle to Environmental Litigation 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity, which provides that a state 
may not be sued without its consent,82 has been extended to pre-
clude fee awards against the federal government in the absence of 
express Congressional authorization. Despite mounting criticism of 
the reach of the doctrine,83 this common law rule is of such vitality 
with regard to attorneys' fees that Congress deemed it appropriate 
to codify it in § 2412 of the Judicial Code84 in order to standardize 
its application. This total prohibition was modified in 1966 to allow 
a judgment of certain costs against the government. S5 The rationale 
for the amendment, on the basis of the Senate Committee Report, 
was to correct the existing disparity of treatment between private 
litigants and the United States with respect to the allowance of 
costS.88 
" NRDC II, 512 F.2d at 1357. 
'2 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I, 12·13 (1890); United States v. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 
309 U.S. 506, 513 (1940) . 
.. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 198·99 (1965); Cramton, 
Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of 
Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REv. 
387,418 (1970) . 
•• 28 U.S.C. §2412 (1970) . 
.. Act of July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-507, 80 Stat. 308, amending 28 U.S.C. § 2412. The 
amended version of § 2412 provides in pertinent part: 
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs, as enumerated 
in section 1920 of this title but not including the fees and expenses of attorneys may be 
awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States 
•• S. REP. No. 1329, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) in UNITED STATES CODE CONGo AND ADMIN. 
NEWS 2528 (1966). 
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The statute, however, expressly excluded the award of attorneys 
fees from taxable costs, notwithstanding the apparent recognition 
of the inequality of means between the government and its adver-
saries. Clarity of wording and legislative history87 leaves little room 
for the courts to perform their interpretive function to meet the 
equitable demands of each case. The reasons which Congress relied 
upon in not permitting attorneys' fees awards in the absence of an 
express statutory provision are unclear. Although more equitable 
treatment for private litigants by awarding costs against the State 
mitigates the governmental advantage, it continues to ignore the 
basic disparity in resources, particularly where the plaintiff must 
rely on marginal foundation support.88 Arguments have been ad-
vanced that the "inequity of recognizing a litigant's right to sue on 
the one hand, but depriving him of otherwise available financial 
implements with which to vindicate that right, is patent."89 One 
public interest litigator commented that § 2412 has had a "most 
significant chilling effect" on the development of fee-shifting as a 
method of inducing private enforcement.9o 
This potent deterrent to citizen suits against the government has 
fed to judicial attempts to circumvent the prohibition of the cost 
statute. Frustration expressed by some courts has resulted in ac-
ceptance of tenuous arguments in support of taxing private inter-
venors or defendants. 91 The attenuated line of thought offered to 
justify the imposition of fees on private corporations turned primar-
ily on the erroneous assumption that the intervenor or private de-
fendant, admittedly having a stake in relaxed environmental 
standards, also shared in the responsibility for inadequately pre-
pared Environmental Impact Statements under NEPA or for the 
government's failure to comply with the applicable statutes.92 
" Letter from Nicholas De B. Katzenbach, Attorney General of The United States, 
Attached to S. REP. No. 1329, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), id. at 2530: "The bill makes clear 
that the fees and expenses of attorneys and expert witnesses may not be taxed against the 
United States." See also Cassata v. Federal Savings and Loan Ins. Corp., 445 F.2d 122, 125 
(7th Cir. 1971). 
" See text at notes 8-13, supra. 
" King and Plater, The Right to Counsel Fees in Public Interest Environmental Litigation, 
41 TENN. L. REV. 27, 87 (1973). 
'" Hearings, supra note 12, at 791 (statement of J. Anthony Kline, Esq.). 
" Wilderness Society v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd sub. nom. Alyeska 
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. 
Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 
(1975). For an extended discussion of the Alyeska case, see text at notes 164-202, infra. 
" In actuality, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) makes federal agencies primarily responsible for the 
preparation of Environmental Impact Statements (EIS's) which the Act requires in "major 
Federal actions." Ct. Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 7 ERC 1681, 1682 (D. Conn. 1972). 
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Courts based these awards, in the absence of express statutory au-
thorization which would have nullified the effect of § 2412, on the 
now defunct private attorney general rationale. 
In cases where no private party was available upon which to im-
pose a fee award, several courts have taxed counsel fees against the 
federal government after finding in other statutes a responsibility 
to assist in providing legal services under certain circumstances. 93 
The courts here sought to broadly construe statutes conferring upon 
the government the duty to represent Indian interests or to provide 
legal counsel in agency proceedings so as to create a federal respon-
sibility to finance plaintiffs' actions against the challenged agency. 
Like the attempts to tax private intervenors to mitigate the effects 
of the sovereign immunity bar, the opinions in these cases had 
stretched the applicable statutes beyond a reasonable construction 
to achieve an equitable result. In view of appellate court disapproval 
of such attempts to circumvent § 2412,94 these cases may serve more 
importantly to underscore the impatience of the judiciary with the 
effects of that statute on public interest litigation. 
Another method of awarding counsel fees to public interest plain-
tiffs, in cases in which the federal government is a party, is to tax 
the fees against the state defendant. Awards in such cases are not 
automatically granted when the plaintiff has demonstrated the req-
uisite "vindication of a Congressional policy,"95 which would other-
wise trigger the private attorney general rationale. Environmental 
statutes such as NEPA, in placing the responsibility of compliance 
upon federal agencies,96 make difficult an attempt to justify the 
imposition of counsel fees by fixing a duty of obedience upon the 
state. Additionally, many courts have held that the Eleventh 
Amendment to the Constitution precludes fee awards against the 
states on a sovereign immunity theory.97 Since the circuits are split 
" Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 360 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd, 
499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); Red School House, Inc. v. 
OEO, 386 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Minn. 1974) . 
.. See Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975); 
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 
420 U.S. 962 (1975). 
D5 Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 402 (1968). See text at notes 123-63 infra for a discussion of the 
private attorney general rationale. 
Oft See note 92 supra. 
91 The Eleventh Amendment provides as follows: "The Judicial power of the United States 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against 
one of the United States by Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State." U.S. CONST., amend. XI. The leading case construing the Amendment with regard 
to judgments and awards against the State is Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
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on the effect of sovereign immunity of the states on fee-shifting, this 
approach can only have a limited impact on the development of 
private enforcement, particularly in view of the demise of the pri-
vate attorney general rationale. 9R 
The cases are legion in which the courts would have awarded 
attorneys' fees to public interest plaintiffs but for the sovereign 
immunity bar.99 Constraints imposed by § 2412 are particularly 
acute where the suit is brought under the provisions of NEPA, in 
which the federal government is invariably the defendant. loo The 
sovereign immunity bar, taken together with the absence of fee-
shifting authorizations in major environmental statutes and judicial 
preclusion of awards based on the private attorney general theory, 
has severely limited the range in which the courts may operate to 
effectuate the established Congressional policy of encouraging pri-
vate enforcement. Therefore Congress should evaluate and resolve 
the conflicting policies behind the sovereign immunity bar and citi-
zen suit provisions in environmental legislation. 
IV. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF FEE-SHIFTING AND THE GROWTH OF THE 
PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL RATIONALE 
A. The Early Development of Fee-Shifting 
Fee-shifting, in its infancy, was employed by the courts as a 
mechanism to spread the costs of successful suit among the plaintiff 
and the beneficiaries of the litigation. The early cases making 
Compare La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94,101-02 n.ll (N.D. Cal. 1972) with Named 
Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Dep't, 496 
F.2d 1017, 1026 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 926 (1975). For more extensive consider-
ation of the problem see Note, The Eleventh Amendment Does Not Bar An Award of Attor-
neys' Fees Based on the Private Attorney General Theory, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 133 (1975); 
Comment, Liability for Attorney's Fees in the Federal Courts- The Private Attorney General 
Exception, 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 201, 230 (1975); Comment, Attorneys' Fees and the 
Eleventh Amendment, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1875, 1902 (1975); Note, Awarding Attorney's Fees 
Against a State Official Sued in His Official Capacity After Edelman v. Jordan, 55 B.U. L. 
REV. 228, 241 (1975). All of the above named commentators concluded that fee awards are a 
permissible imposition on state treasuries. 
" While recognizing the disparity among the lower courts on the issue, the Supreme Court, 
in Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 269-70 n.44 (1975) declined to address this question. Since Alyeska, 
the Court has elected not to hear cases which present Eleventh Amendment issues with regard 
to fee-shifting. See, e.g., Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded 
for further consideration in light of Alyeska, 421 U.S. 982 (1975); Named Individual Members 
of the San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Dep't, 496 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 926 (1975). 
" E.g., Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 4 ERC 1681 (D. Conn. 1972). 
"HI E.g., Alyeska, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975). 
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awards for this purpose were grounded in the original authority of 
the chancellor to do equity in particular cases. So reasoned the 
Supreme Court in the leading case, Trustees v. Greenough, 101 in 
which a plaintiff who succeeded in rescuing a trust fund from a 
delinquent trustee was allowed an award of attorneys' fees to be 
drawn from the reclaimed fund. The suit, filed on behalf of other 
participants in the fund, created a common fund from which equity 
demanded a ratable contribution for legal fees incurred. The Court 
in Trustees found nothing in the 1853 fee bill, 102 which had severely 
limited awards of counsel fees, to deprive equity courts of their 
"long established control" over the costs and charges of litigation 
involving the rights to a general or common fund. loa 
In Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank,104 the Court further devel-
oped the "common fund" exception to the rule prohibiting fee-
shifting. There, a successful suit against an insolvent bank, which 
resulted in a lien on funds earmarked for repayment of money de-
posited by the plaintiff, established, by collateral estoppel, the 
rights of fourteen other depositors who were not represented in the 
suit. The absence of a class action or the actual creation of a fund 
was held not to preclude the reimbursement of counsel fees on the 
theory that plaintiff's success would have a stare decisis effect enti-
tling others similarly situated to enforce their own liens against the . 
bank. 105 Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court in Sprague, 
noted that the creation, in essence, of a constructive fund, was a 
judicial act that "hardly touch(ed)" the general equity power of the 
federal courts "to do justice between a party and the beneficiaries 
of his litigation."106 This broad reading of the equitable exception to 
the American Rule for common fund cases proved to be an impor-
tant antecedent to the development of the private attorney general 
theory discussed below. 107 
'"' 105 U.S. 527 (1881) [hereinafter cited as Trustees). 
,," Act of February 26, 1853, 10 Stat. 161, ch. 80 § 1. For a discussion of the statute and its 
present day vitality, see text at notes 39-44, supra. 
"'" Trustees, 105 U.S. at 536. This exception to the American Rule was extended by Central 
RR & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885), to give directly to plaintiffs attorney a 
right to recover reasonable fees from the beneficiaries of a fund created or retained by his 
efforts. 
"" 307 U.S. 161 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Sprague). 
"" [d. at 167. 
"" [d. This expansive construction of the power of equity is echoed in other decisions by 
the Court. See, e.g., Union P. Ry. Co. v. Chicago RI. & P. Ry. Co., 163 U.S. 564, 601 (1896); 
Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946). 
'"' See text at notes 129-40 infra. For a detailed, but more critical analysis of the "common 
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In contrast to the cost spreading rationale in common fund cases, 
the federal courts, in the exercise of their equity powers, have taxed 
counsel fees against parties acting in bad faith prior to or during the 
litigation as a punishment for such conduct. 'Fhe courts have found 
an award of reasonable attorneys' fees appropriate where the unsuc-
cessfullitigant has engaged in vexatious, harassing, dilatory, or oth-
erwise unreasonable conduct. lOS For example, defendants found to 
have wilfully disobeyed or failed to make good faith efforts to com-
ply with constitutional imperatives in desegregation l09 and reappor-
tionment cases llO have been taxed under the punitive rationale of 
the bad faith exception. Furthermore, a court may assess attorneys' 
fees for disobedience of a judicial order.1I1 Although the bad faith 
rationale has not experienced the same expansion as the other equi-
table exceptions the demise of the private attorney general doctrine 
may prompt the courts to look more carefully at the behavior of the 
litigants in search of a non-statutory basis for an award of counsel 
fees. 112 
B. Fee-Shifting in the Public Interest: Toward a Private Attorney 
General Rationale 
The need to encourage citizens to litigate important social issues 
and to vindicate personal rights has resulted in an effort by the 
judiciary to expand access to the courts. Predicated, in part, on the 
recognition of practical difficulties inherent in citizen participation 
in modern government and influence in bureaucratic decision-
making,113 these judicial efforts have chipped away at the barriers 
which had previously relegated individual grievances to the cumber-
some legislative process. The creation of private rights of action 
under federal statutes which were merely declarative of certain 
fund" cases, see Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 849, 850-81 (1975). 
"" See, e.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962); Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. 
Humble Oil & Refining Co., 441 F.2d 631, 637 (5th Cir. 1971); see also 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE § 54.77(2), p. 1709 (2d ed. 1974). 
"" See, e.g., Bell v. School Bd. of Powhatan Cty., 321 F.2d 494,500 (4th Cir. 1963); Rolfe 
v. County Bd. of Educ. of Lincoln Cty., 391 F.2d 77, 81 (6th Cir. 1968). 
1111 Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 942 (1972). See 
Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 270 n.46 (1975) (rejecting the application of the private attorney general 
rationale in Sims but approving of the bad faith ground). 
III E.g., Toledo Scale CO. V. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923). 
112 See, e.g., Doe V. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541,547 (8th Cir. 1975). 
11:1 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,111 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963). 
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rights l14 or provided only for government enforcement 1 15 has contrib-
uted to increased access to the federal courts. In the environmental 
area, relaxation of standing requirements to permit challenges to 
agency action by public interest groups reflects judicial cognizance 
of the role of the courts in protecting our natural resources. 116 Set in 
the context of these developments, fee-shifting in public interest 
litigation can be understood as a logical extension of these attempts 
to open the courts to legitimate citizen grievances. 
While the coalescence of the growth of equity power to transfer 
fees and the recently expanded access to the courts provided famil-
iar ground for the courts to base awards to public interest plaintiffs, 
the federal judiciary primarily looked to Congressional policy as the 
foundation upon which to build the private attorney general doc-
trine. With the appearance of early fee-shifting provisions in certain 
enforcement statutes,1I7 some lower federal courts were willing to 
extrapolate from this Congressional inclination a basis for awarding 
fees to private parties suing to enforce broad statutory policies, even 
where the relevant statute was silent on the fee award question.us 
The Supreme Court, however, was initially reticent to go beyond the 
boundaries of statutory fee-shifting. In Fleischmann Distilling 
Corporation v. Maier Brewing Company, 119 the Court held an award 
of attorneys' fees inappropriate where the applicable trademark 
statutel20 "meticulously" provided the complete remedies available 
under the Act without authorizing the transfer of litigation costS.1 21 
Basic to the holding in Fleischmann was the Court's adoption of the 
canon of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius, which states, that specific mention of one remedy implies 
exclusion of another. This conservative approach to fee-shifting 
temporarily chilled the development of awards as a method of miti-
gating the economic deterrent to private enforcement offederalleg-
islation. 122 
,,, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 414 n.13 (1968); ct. Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
115 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 
544 (1969); but see Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers Corp., 327 F. Supp. 17, 21-22 (D.D.C. 1971). 
'" See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 
(1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
'17 E.g., Securities & Exchange Act of 1934 § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1970). 
'" See, e.g., Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951) (civil rights 
violation within a union). 
11. 386 U.S. 714 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Fleischmann). 
1211 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (1970). 
12' Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 719. 
122 See, e.g., Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 848 (E.D. Va. 1968) 
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One year later the Court had occasion to make substantial inroads 
into Fleischmann. The per curiam opinion in Newman v. Piggie 
Park Enterprises 123 stands as the foundation and most concise state-
ment of the now defunct private attorney general rationale. In a suit 
brought under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964124 to enjoin 
racial discrimination in a restaurant chain, the court allowed the 
successful plaintiffs an award pursuant to the fee-shifting provision 
in the Act. 125 More importantly, the Court went further in dicta by 
declaring that a plaintiff who obtains an injunction under the Act, 
"does so not for himself alone but as a 'private attorney general,' 
vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest prior-
ity."126 The Court relied explicitly on the strength of the legislative 
history 127 and implicitly on the heightened national demand for the 
eradication of racial discrimination that marked the 1960's in con-
cluding that the Congressional policy was in fact of the "highest 
priori ty . "128 
Despite the strong dicta in Piggie Park, the decision had to be 
limited to statutory fee-shifting issues. Expansion by the Court was 
required in order to develop the private attorney general doctrine 
into an equitable exception to be operative in the absence of specific 
statutory authorization. Such expansion came indirectly from the 
Court in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Company.129 The action was 
brought as a shareholders' derivative suit under § 14(a) of the Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1934130 to set aside a merger approved by the 
shareholders on the basis of a misleading proxy statement. The 
(fees denied in suit brought under the Securities Act of 1934). 
12:1 390 U.S. 400 (1968). 
,,, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II § 204(1), 42 u.s.c. §2000a-3(a) (1970). 
125 [d. § 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970). 
'20 Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 402. The private attorney general theory was first employed to 
expand the class of persons who had standing to challenge administrative action. Associated 
Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), dismissed as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). 
127 Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 402 n.3, citing S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 
11, 24 (1964); H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 18 (1963); H.R. REP. No. 
914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1-2 (1963). 
12M The holding of Piggie Park was twice reaffirmed in school desegregation suits brought 
under the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1974). 
Northcross v. Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427 (1973); Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974). 
Section 718 of the Act, id. § 1617, a discretionary fee-shifting provision similar to the clause 
construed in Piggie Park, was held in both cases to require an award of fees to the successful 
plaintiffs. The Court in Northcross found that the plaintiffs were" 'private attorneys general' 
vindicating national policy in the same sense as are plaintiffs in Title II actions." 412 U.S. 
at 428. 
'29 396 U.S. 375 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Mills]. 
1:'" 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970). 
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Court held that an award of attorneys' fees was appropriate not-
withstanding the absence of specific statutory authorization for fee-
shifting or a common financial benefit or fund created by the suit. 
Confronted with similar Congressional treatment of fee awards as 
was presented in Fleischmann, the Court was forced to detail its 
attempt to distinguish that case. Provisions for fee-shifting under 
two other sections of the Securities Exchange Act l31 rendered the 
statute susceptible to the expressio unius argument held applicable 
to the remedies available in Fleischmann. However, the Mills 
Court, relying in part on an analogous Second Circuit decision, 132 
held that the absence of express Congressional authorization for a 
fee-shifting under § 14(a) did not preclude such an award in certain 
cases. 133 The Mills opinion drew an analogy from the recently ac-
knowledged judicial power to create a private right of action under 
the Actl34 to establish the ability to award counsel fees. 135 Thus, the 
Court concluded that the lack of Congressional mandate for fee-
shifting under the statutory section in issue did not deprive a court 
of the power to award counsel fees in appropriate circumstances. 136 
To buttress this circumvention of Congressional silence, the tradi-
tional formulation of the common fund exception was expanded to 
encompass benefits to a corporation and its shareholders which were 
incapable of expression in monetary terms. This alternative holding 
provided the impetus for the lower courts to apply the private attor-
ney general rationale to non-statutory fee-shifting. The Court held 
that where a successful suit conferred a "substantial benefit on an 
ascertainable class" and the "court's jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of the suit makes possible an award that will operate to 
spread the costs proportionately among them," fee-shifting is per-
missible. 137 
The Court further emphasized the validity of this form of benefit 
in saying: ". . . private stockholders' actions of this sort 'involve 
corporate therapeutics' and furnish a benefit to all shareholders by 
providing an important means of enforcement of the proxy stat-
,a, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 9(e), 18(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1970). 
"" Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943). The court in Smolowe awarded 
attorneys' fees, in a suit by stockholders to recover short swing profits for the corporation 
under § 16(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, "on the theory that the corporation which had 
received the benefit of attorney's services should pay the reasonable value thereof." [d. at 241. 
"'" 396 U.S. at 390-91. 
" .. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964). 
"15 Mills, 396 U.S. at 391. 
"" [d. at 390-91. 
m [d. at 393-94. 
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ute."138 In effect, the conclusion that vindication of statutory policy 
was a significant benefit conferred upon the corporation by private 
enforcement suits engendered at least an expanded construction of 
equity powers under the common fund exception, if not its merger 
with the private attorney general theory articulated in Piggie Park. 
Mills was therefore read by the lower courts to provide authority in 
a broad range of cases for fee-shifting in the absence of express 
Congressional authorization. 139 
C. Expansion of the Private Attorney General Theory in the Lower 
Federal Courts 
The inferior federal courts were particularly receptive to the Su-
preme Court's apparent expansion of equity power to award fees in 
the absence of statutory authorization. The broad language of Mills 
and Piggie Park was interpreted to permit awards to plaintiffs who 
effectuated "important" Congressional policies by securing rights 
and benefits due a certain class or group. For example, the Fifth 
Circuit gave Mills a typically generous reading, noting that the 
decision was "better understood as resting heavily on 'overriding 
considerations' that private suits are necessary to effectuate con-
gressional policy and that awards of attorneys' fees are necessary to 
encourage private litigants to initiate such suits."I4O 
The lower courts treated the size and relevant common interests 
of the class of beneficiaries more liberally than the immediately 
ascertainable class of shareholders in the Mills case. 14I The most 
"1M [d. at 396, citing Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee 
Awards, 69 HARv. L. REV. 658, 659, 662-63 (1956). 
,30 The common fund exception was again given broad reach in Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 
(1973). In that case, a former union member expelled for decrying certain union actions and 
policies, sued for reinstatement under § 102 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclo-
sure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970). The Supreme Court affirmed the award of attorneys' fees, 
despite the absence of a fee-shifting provision in § 102. Fleischmann was distinguished by 
reading authorization in that section to grant "such relief ... as may be appropriate" to 
include fee awards. Under the expanded common benefit doctrine developed in Mills, the 
Court held the suit, by vindicating plaintiff's right of free speech guaranteed by the Act, had 
rendered a substantial benefit to the union and its membership. 412 U.S. at 8. The Court 
concluded that an award in this case fell "squarely within the traditional equitable power of 
federal courts to award such fees whenever 'overriding considerations indicate the need for 
such a recovery.''' [d. at 9, quoting Mills, 396 U.S. at 391-92. 
1111 Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 145 (5th Cir. 1971). 
'" See. e.g., Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1219, 1225 (C.D. 
Cal. 1973) (fee awarded in private antitrust suit since plaintiff vindicated a compelling 
national economic interest which benefits inured to the "marketplace"); Brandenburger v. 
Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 888-89 (9th Cir. 1974) (fee awarded in suit striking down a dura-
tional residency requirement for welfare recipients which benefited a "significant class" com-
posed of "potential welfare recipients and interstate travelers"). 
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significant development of the private attorney general doctrince 
came in suits vindicating federal rights H2 and challenging racially 
discriminatory practices. 143 Awards in these cases were often prem-
ised on the recognition that a "private attorney general" who ad-
vances the public interest should not be forced to bear the costs of 
litigation. 144 Alternatively, the courts reasoned that the vindication 
of important rights ought not be made dependent upon the financial 
resources of the plaintiff; therefore, elimination of an impediment 
such as counsel fees would go far to encourage these suits. 145 While 
the Supreme Court envisioned equity based awards as being discre-
tionary,146 some of the lower courts held such an "award loses much 
of its discretionary character and becomes a part of the effective 
remedy a court should fashion to encourage public minded suits 
... and to carry out Congressional policy."147 
Environmental plaintiffs also benefited from the private attor-
ney general doctrine, albeit to a lesser extent than civil rights plain-
tiffs. As noted above,148 fee awards in environmental suits, particu-
larly those brought under NEPA, were precluded by the sovereign 
immunity bar. Additionally, certain litigated environmental issues 
lacked clearly defined statutory and public policy imperatives that 
characterize racial discrimination and civil rights cases. The courts, 
lacking an unassailable public policy preference, were less willing to 
encourage conservationist suits through fee awards. 149 
'" See, e.g., Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 
(1973) (fee awarded in suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) to vindicate free speech 
guarantee); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 942 (1972) 
(fee award to plaintiff who successfully sued the state on reapportionment issue); Wyatt v. 
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (fee award in suit establishing a constitutional right to treatment 
for mental patients). 
U:I See, e.g., Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972) (fee awarded in suit brought 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) based on racial discrimination in housing); N.A.A.C.P. v. 
Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974) (fee awarded in 
successful action to enjoin discrimination in state police hiring practices); see generally cases 
collected in Derfner, Attorneys' Fees in Pro Bono Publico Cases, reprinted in Hearings, supra 
note 12, at 862. 
1" See, e.g., Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143, 145 (8th Cir. 1974). 
1" See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part sub nom., 
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). 
1" Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973). 
117 Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 694 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 942 (1972). 
1" See text at notes 99·100 supra. 
1" Harrisburg Coalition Against Ruining the Environment v. Volpe, 381 F. Supp. 893, 898-
99 (M.D. Pa. 1974); cf. Delaware Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 62 
F.R.D. 353, 356 (D. Del. 1974). 
• 
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Notwithstanding the sporadic incidence offee-shifting in environ-
mental litigation, the private attorney general doctrine provided an 
important impetus for litigation over ecological and conservation 
issues. 15o In one of the leading cases applying the doctrine, La Raza 
Unida v. Volpe,151 the district court awarded counsel fees to a public 
interest organization which had obtained an injunction halting the 
construction of a highway through public parklands. The court ar-
ticulated three requirements the satisfaction of which would qualify 
plaintiffs for a fee award: "1) the effectuation of strong public 
policies; 2) the fact that numerous people received benefits from 
plaintiffs' litigation success; 3) the fact that only a private party 
could have been expected to bring the action .... "152 
In this particular suit, both federal and state agencies were named 
as defendants, resulting in a private party mounting the challenge. 
The requisite strength of public policy was found in federallegisla-
tion designed to prevent wholesale destruction of our natural re-
sources by highway construction 153 and to protect the interests of 
persons displaced by such projects. 154 The consideration of alterna-
tive routes to highway projects running through parklands, which 
the La Raza Unida plaintiffs had gained through the judicial pro-
cess, was mandated by the Department of Transportation Act. 155 As 
further support for its award, the court noted that to force plaintiffs 
to pay their counsel fees after effectively policing those charged with 
implementing Congressional mandates would be "tantamount to a 
penalty. "156 
In taxing fees against the state defendant,157 the court noted that 
all state residents had received the fruits of the litigation. By match-
ing the state treasury, as the source of the fund, with the residents 
as beneficiaries, the court concluded that it was following the dic-
tates of Mills. 158 This somewhat loose adaptation of Mills raises an 
'54' See Witt, After Alyeska: Can the Contender Survive, JURIS DOCTOR (October 1975), at 
35. 
'51 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972) [hereinafter cited as La Raza Unidal. 
152 Id. at 101. 
15. E.g., Department of Transportation Act of 1968 § 4(f), 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970). 
'51 Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisitions Policies Act of 1970 § 
201,42 U.S.C. § 4621 (1970). 
'55 Department of Transportation Act of 1968 § 4(f), 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970). See 
generally Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
'" La Raza Unida, 57 F.R.D. at 101. 
157 The court dismissed the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity argument which led 
other federal courts to deny an award in otherwise appropriate circumstances. See text and 
notes 96-98, supra. 
, •• La Raza Unida, 57 F.R.D. at 101. 
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important question as to the application of the common benefit 
rationale for fee-shifting in environmental litigation. In contrast to 
the direct benefit of increased corporate control which inured to the 
stockholder beneficiaries in Mills or the actual recovery of a fund 
in Trustees, the actual benefits which accrue to the general public 
in successful environmental suits are difficult to trace with accu-
racy. While maintenance of clean air or clean water may fairly be 
viewed as a benefit uniformly accruing to all members of the public, 
the preservation of beautiful open spaces and parklands cannot be 
easily identified as such. The number of persons actually taking 
advantage of public parklands, although difficult to ascertain, cer-
tainly amounts to less that the entire taxpaying public. This inabil-
ity to match cost with the benefits of the litigation required a 
strained interpretation of the common benefit line of cases to justify 
a fee award against the government. 159 The La Raza Unida court and 
other federal courts, which found partial support in Mills for taxing 
fees against the government were, in reality, acting without prece-
dential guidance from the Supreme Court.160 
Another potential defect in the private attorney general doctrine 
illustrated by La Raza Unida was the latitude accorded judges in 
determining which types of private enforcement litigation were suf-
ficiently invested with the public interest or involved high priority 
legislation demanding inducement of fee-shifting. In La Raza 
Unida, the protection of parklands and assistance to persons dis-
placed by eminent domain taking for mass transit projects, as the 
relevant statutory policies, were probably no stronger in the minds 
of the legislators than statutes aimed at product safety or the regu-
'" This strain on the logical application of a common benefit theory does not, however, 
negate its utility as a justification for taxing the government in order to spread the cost of 
private enforcement among its intended beneficiaries. When a private citizen or public inter-
est group acts as an attorney general in enforcing federal legislation with which the govern-
ment itself has failed to comply, they ought not bear the litigation costs of performing a 
function ordinarily assigned to a public official and defrayed through tax revenues. While the 
government may be an effective mechanism for redistributing the burden of private enforce-
ment suits, this theory is less apposite when applied to justify taxing fess against a private 
violator of environmental protection statutes. Support for taxing such violators may more 
appropriately come from a punitive or an incentive rationale. 
"" This position was taken by several commentators. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary 
Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REV. 849, 897 (1975); King & Plater, The 
Right to Counsel Fees in Public Interest Environmental Litigation, 41 TENN. L. REV. 27, 48 
(1973); but compare Note, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite 
Co., 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 316, 330 (1971). Consistent with these criticisms of the expansive 
interpretation of Mills, the Supreme Court in Alyeska noted the impropriety of placing within 
the common benefit framework suits which involve millions of taxpayers who allegedly re-
ceive intangible benefits, 421 U.S. at 265 n.39 (1975). 
• 
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lation of securities markets. Thus it may have been possible under 
the doctrine to cause an award to turn automatically upon the invo-
cation of a federal statute without additional indicia of Congres-
sional concern. 
In Piggie Park, the statutory fee-shifting case which spawned the 
notion of private enforcement as vindicating strong Congressional 
policies, the Court relied on legislative history which indicated a 
Congressional concern of preeminent importance. 161 In lip service 
recognition of a need to find a heightened and immediate legislative 
interest or concern, the lower courts at times noted that a fee award 
was not a license to encourage enforcement of all statutes. 162 Yet the 
courts, in purporting to find a strong Congressional policy, could in 
essence rely on a subjective judgment of public good or benefit. The 
judges were thus set free to exercise their discretion in determing 
what constituted socially desirable litigation which warranted fee 
awards. 
Thus, prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Alyeska, the 
private attorney general doctrine was poorly defined. Despite the 
broad language of Mills and Piggie Park, which had triggered its 
development, the doctrine had not been expressly approved by the 
Supreme Court. The Court had, on several occasions, declined to 
pass on the validity of the doctrine as a rationale for transferring 
fees in public interest litigation. 163 
V. THE ALYESKA LITIGATION AND THE DEMISE OF THE PRIVATE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL DOCTRINE 
The Alyeska litigation was commenced in 1970 by several 
environmental interest groupsl64 against the Secretary of the Inte-
riorl65 to halt the construction of the trans-Alaskan oil pipeline. 
After two years of court proceedings, during which construction of 
the pipeline was suspended by preliminary injunction,166 the plain-
'61 See text at note 127, supra. 
'62 La Raza Unida, 57 F.R.D. at 99; Lee v. Southern Homesites Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 145 
(5th Cir. 1971). 
'''' Northcross v. Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 429 n.2 (1973); F.D. Rich Co. v. U.S. ex rei. 
Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 130 (1974). 
,61 Wilderness Society, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. and Friends of the Earth. 
'" The State of Alaska, to present another version of the public interest implications of 
the pipeline, and Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, a consortium composed of seven major 
oil companies, was granted leave to intervene early in the proceedings. 
'" Wilderness Society v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970). For a more extensive 
discussion of the litigation prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Alyeska, see Dominick & 
Brody, The Alaska Pipeline: Wilderness Society v. Morton and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
Authorization Act, 23 AMER. U. L. REV. 337 (1973). 
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tiffs obtained a declaration by the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court of Appeals167 that the developer's rights of way granted by the 
Secretary of the Interior were in violation of § 28 of the Mineral 
Leasing Act of 1920.188 Following their success in temporarily halting 
the project pending further study, the environmental groups filed a 
bill of costs with the Court of Appeals. They requested an award for 
over four thousand hours of attorney time allocated in connection 
with th~ numerous motion hearings and appeals undertaken during 
the course of the litigation. 
Sitting en banc the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals 
decided in favor of an award of attorneys' fees relying entirely on 
the private attorney general doctrine. 16D Since an award taxed 
against the federal government was precluded by the sovereign 
immunity bar, and the court determined an award against the State 
of Alaska, irrespective of proscription by the Eleventh Amendment, 
would be inappropriate where the State had intervened to present 
the "public interest implications" of the pipeline,170 the burden of 
plaintiffs' counsel fees fell on Alyeska, the consortium of oil compa-
nies involved in the construction of the pipeline. Because Alyeska 
had an immense financial interest in the outcome of the suit and 
had been a vigorous participant at all stages of the litigation, the 
court found the consortium to be the real party in interest,171 and 
remanded to the district court with directions to tax the oil compa-
'67 Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 
(1973). 
IR' 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). Although allegations that the Department of the Interior had 
failed to comply with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4321 et seq. (1970), were fully briefed and argued, the court declined to adjudicate these 
issues on ripeness grounds. 479 F.2d at 890. 
IR. Wilderness Society v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974) [hereinafter cited as 
Wilderness Il]. Three justices of the seven member panel vigorously dissented. 
17' [d. at 1036 n.8. 
17' Alyeska, being comprised of oil companies which account for approximately 20% of the 
national oil market and do business in 49 states, was arguably an appropriate medium for 
redistributing the cost to the general public. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 288 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). The Wilderness II court dismissed this seeming infusion of the Mills common 
benefit rule into the private attorney general exception. 495 F.2d at 1029. However, the real 
party in interest justification is likewise vulnerable to challenge. As an intervenor, Alyeska 
was neither involuntarily brought into the litigation as a violator of the relevant statutes nor, 
in reality, charged by statute with compliance under NEPA or the Mineral Leasing Act; 
therefore, to tax attorneys' fees merely for vigorous participation and interest in the litigation 
against a party so situated seems inequitable. See Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 65-66 
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975). This strained rationale for shifting fees to 
a private intervenor, criticized in Sierra Club, again points to the inequity created by the 
sovereign immunity bar. 
.. 
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nies one-half of what it determined to be reasonable attorneys' 
fees. 172 
The constellation of events which surrounded the litigation made 
tenuous the requisite ascertainment of strong Congressional public 
policy which would trigger the private attorney general rationale. In 
response to the delay in construction of the pipeline engendered by 
the litigation, Congress enacted legislation amending the Mineral 
Leasing Act to allow the granting of permits sought by the oil com-
panies and declaring that no further statements under NEPA would 
be required before construction commenced. 173 The amendments 
did, however, include certain provisions to insure safety and envi-
ronmental protection along the pipeline route. 174 Moreover, the Sen-
ate Committee which reported out the bill explicitly noted that the 
litigation-produced delay had lessened the risk of environmental 
damage. 175 
In acknowledging the national commitment to protecting the nat-
ural environment, as exemplified by NEPA, the Court of Appeals 
noted benefits from the litigation in the form of forced reconsidera-
tion of the environmental consequences of the project176 and the 
"inclusion of strong safeguards in plans for the Alaskan line."177 
Instead of construing the Congressional intervention as a rejection 
ofthe environmentalists' position, the majority read it to be a recog-
nition of the substantial policy and technical issues which the litiga-
tion had served to focus. 178 The accumulation of these benefits gave 
rise to the majority's conclusion that plaintiffs had vindicated the 
statutory interests of all citizens affected by the proposed pipeline 
project. 179 
In contrast to the aura of successful litigation portrayed by the 
majority, the disservice to the public caused by the delay in con-
struction, concern with blocking access to much needed oil reserves 
and the attendant increase in cost and dependence on foreign petro-
leum marked the dissenting judges' rejection of the fee award. 1Ro The 
172 Wilderness II, 495 F.2d at 1036. 
173 Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. 93-153, Tit. II, 87 Stat. 584, 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1651 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1974). 
'" [d. at § 204(b), 43 U.S.C. § 1653(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
175 S. REp. No. 93-207, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1973). 
"" Wilderness II 495 F.2d at 1034. 
177 [d. at 1035 n.5, citing 119 CONGo REC. S 13574 (daily ed. July 16, 1973) (remarks of 
Senator Fannin). 
'7M [d. at 1035. 
17. [d. at 1032. 
'". [d. at 1041 (MacKinnon dissenting). Judge MacKinnon went so far as to boldly state: 
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Mineral Leasing Act amendments were viewed as the definitive 
statement of Congressional preference for immediate resumption 
and completion of the pipeline. IRI 
What emerges from the juxtaposition of majority and dissenting 
opinions is that Congressional policy on this question was at best 
ambiguous. The case is therefore instructive in highlighting the dif-
ficulty in adducing a strong Congressional policy, particularly in 
environmental lawsuits where a demand for energy resource devel-
opment and interest in the preservation of the environment collide. 
Moreover, it indicates the inherent weakness in allowing judges, 
absent legislative guidance, to render subjective assessments or 
speculate as to those statutes which require the inducement of fee-
shifting for private enforcement. The resultant differences in the 
perception of justice and the public interest may undermine the 
public confidence in a neutral judiciary. 
Upon a grant of certiorari, IR2 the Supreme Court reversed the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in a 5-2 decision.IR:l The 
Court held that under the American Rule attorneys' fees would not 
be recoverable on a private attorney general theory in the absence 
of express statutory authorization. IR4 Mr. Justice White, speaking 
for the Court, engaged in an extensive historical analysis to docu-
ment both statutory and judicial adherence to the American Rule.IR!i 
In establishing the Rule's continuing vitality, principal reliance was 
placed on the 1853 docketing fees statute, which undertook to limit 
the circumstances where fee awards were appropriate. IR6 The combi-
nation of the present version of that statute,IR7 being essentially 
unaltered, and the express fee-shifting authorization contained in 
various recently enacted statutes lRR was therefore read as being in-
dicative of Congressional hegemony over the creation of this rem-
edy. 
"When we subsidize lawyers to bring such suits against our national interest we promote our 
own destruction." [d. (dissenting opinion) (emphasis in the original). 
'" [d. at 1039 (MacKinnon dissenting). "Judging from Congress' most recent action, plain· 
tiffs have been frustrating the policy Congress considers highly desirable and of the utmost 
urgency." [d. at 1042 (Wilkey dissenting) (emphasis in the original). 
'M2 419 U.S. 823 (1974). 
'''' Alyeska, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Justices Powell and Douglas took no part in the considera· 
tion of the case, while Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented. 
'" [d. at 269. 
'" [d. at 247·62. 
'" [d. at 252·56. 
'" 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1923(a) (1970). 
'" See notes 48-51, supra. 
1976] ALYESKA: ATTORNEYS' FEES 329 
The Court, however, failed to convincingly treat its own preced-
ents which establish a coordinate independent equity power to 
award fees under the several flexible exceptions to the American 
Rule. The proposition that sporadic Congressional exercise of its 
prerogative to annex fee-shifting provisions to certain statutes 
preempted the judicial creation or at least maintenance of non-
statutory theories upon which to base awards ignores the well-
established breadth of equitable remedies. 189 Such an argument, as 
noted by the dissent, is logically inconsistent with the Court's ac-
ceptance of the previously sanctioned bad faith l90 and common 
fund 191 exceptions. 192 Assuming that the federal judiciary has the 
power "to do equity" in these situations, the same power would 
likewise attach in cases where justice requires a fee award to ratably 
allocate the burden of private enforcement. 193 
In rebuttal to the majority's broad construction of the docketing 
fees statute, the dissent invoked the Court's prior rejection in 
Trustees and Sprague of arguments that the statutes operated as a 
plenary restraint on the equity power to award fees. 194 In both 
Sprague and Trustees, the Court had explicitly held that the statute 
imposed no bar to an award of fees in common fund cases, and 
contained nothing which could be construed to deprive equity courts 
of their long-established control over taxing litigation costS.19a 
Mr. Justice Marshall's dismissal of the Court's interpretation of 
Congressional silence as to fee transfersl96 was appropriately 
grounded in the broad language of Mills and Hall v. ColeY7 These 
recent decisions offer a clear statement of the Court's preference 
prior to Alyeska for interpreting Congressional silence "not as a 
prohibition, but as an authorization for the Court to decide the 
attorneys' fees issue in the exercise of its coordinate, equitable 
power."198If the holding of Alyeska is viewed solely as evolving from 
'" 421 U.S. at 282 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
'''' See, e.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962). 
IU' See, e.g., Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939). 
19' See 421 U.S. at 278-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
'''' As Mr. Justice Marshall correctly states, the only explanation which preserves the 
internal logic of the Court's argument is that these already sanctioned exceptions were too 
well established to jettison. [d. at 278 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
IU. [d. at 278-79 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
'" Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 
U.S. 527, 535-36 (1881). 
'" 421 U.S. at 281-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
'" 412 U.S. 1 (1973). See note 139, supra, for a discussion of Hall v. Cole. 
IU' 421 U.S. at 281 (Marshall, J., dissenting), citing Mills, 396 U.S. 375, 391 (1970). 
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the judicial power argument addressed above, the lack of cogency 
undermines its credibility. 
Nothwithstanding the apparent internal inconsistency or the 
Court's failure to square its reasoning with even the most conserva-
tive reading of Mills, the Court correctly reversed the award of fees 
under the private attorney general rationale. Alternative support for 
the holding may be adduced from the inability of the judiciary to 
develop manageable standards to govern the use of the private at-
torney general rationale as an incentive for private enforcement 
actions. 1D9 This interpretation of the majority's reasoning is most 
directly responsive to the demonstrated deficiencies in the applica-
tion of the doctrine,20o and is therefore the most persuasive ground 
for the decision. 
Recognizing the Court's concern with the vagaries inherent in a 
fee-shifting scheme dependent upon a trial judge's subjective as-
sessment of the importance of a public policy involved in a particu-
lar case, Mr. Justice Marshall attempted to salvage the doctrine by 
suggesting several criteria to aid the courts in determining the pro-
priety of requested awards. 201 The principal factor to be considered 
would be whether the "important right being protected is one ac-
tually or necessarily shared by the general public or some class 
thereof."202 Mr. Justice Marshall's formulation adds little to the 
criteria established in La Raza Unida to assist in the crucial deter-
mination of which legislative policies are actually of the highest 
priority. One need look no further than the Wilderness II opinion to 
witness the enigma involved in ascertaining the "important right" 
without statutory guidance. The conflicting perceptions of public 
policy illustrated by the 4-3 split in the lower court's decision in 
Wilderness II underscored this problem. 
In light of the dissent's failure to propose viable standards for 
gauging a statute's importance, the holding in Alyeska attains cred-
ibility. Nevertheless, a restrictive reading of the Court's finding of 
legislative dominance over fee-shifting will unduly constrain the 
, .. [d. at 266 n.39. 
~M1 See text at notes 160-63 and text following note 181, supra. 
2111 421 U.S. at 285 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
202 [d. Other factors implicated in the determination are whether "(2) ... the plaintiff's 
pecuniury interest in the outcome, if any, would not normally justify incurring the cost of 
counsel; and (3) shifting that cost to the defendant would effectively place it on a class that 
benefits from the litigation." [d. Note that this third requirement presents the same admix-
ture of vindication of Congressional policy drawn from Piggie Park and the common benefit 
rationale of the Mills case which left the lower courts without precedential foundation. See 
[d. at 265 n.39. See also text at notes 157-60, supra. 
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jurisdiction which equity courts have traditionally exercised where 
compelling circumstances require. The rationale of Alyeska should 
therefore be ascribed to the Court's recognition of a need to impose 
prudential limits on the power of a federal judge to grant awards of 
attorneys' fees to public interest plaintiffs in the absence of statu-
tory authorization. The demise of the private attorney general doc-
trine need not be interpreted as a judgment on the merits of fee-
shifting or the utility of redistributing the cost of legal services to 
encourage private enforcement of environmental legislation. In de-
ciding not to embroil the federal courts in political and social policy 
debates, the Court merely returned to the legislature the burden of 
ascertaining those public policies which demand private enforce-
ment incentive through fee-shifting. 
CONCLUSION 
Recent legislative authorization of citizen suits in numerous envi-
ronmental protection statutes has created a vital role for the federal 
courts in the process of environmental decision-making. 203 Given 
this consistent Congressional approval of private enforcement in the 
courts, the need to encourage such suits becomes clear. Citizen suit 
provisions contained in these statutes, however, will remain empty 
invitations, without an opportunity for public interest plaintiffs, 
lacking any direct monetary stake in the litigation, to recover the 
costs of vindicating statutory rights or enforcing Congressional man-
dates. Citizens and environmental interest groups assuming this 
watchdog role are in actuality "private attorneys general" perform-
ing an enforcement function ordinarily assigned to government offi-
cials who are compensated by the public treasury. If for no other 
reason, logic demands that a citizen suing to enforce compliance 
with an environmental protection statute should not be forced to 
bear the litigation costs incident to performing a quasi-official func-
tion. 
With private foundation sources of funding for environmental 
plaintiffs uncertain, the need to develop a comprehensive scheme of 
fee awards for public interest litigants is acute. In suits against the 
government, an award will act to redistribute the costs to the gen-
eral public, who in most instances, is the intended beneficiary. Ad-
2"" Some commentators take issue with the propriety of an active judiciary in this area. 
Heyman, Quarles, Sive & Cutler, The Challenge of Environmental Controls, 28 Bus. LAW 9, 
22-28 (1973) (remarks of Lloyd Cutler, Esq.). But see Leventhal, Environmental Decision-
making and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 542 (1974). 
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ditionally, this mechanism for equalizing the resources of private, 
non-profit plaintiffs doing battle with government and corporate 
entities has not been an administrative burden on the courts, as 
witnessed by their willingness, prior to Alyeska, to grant fee awards 
with impressive regularity.204 
While a comprehensive Congressional scheme which entitles a 
plaintiff,205 suing under any environmental protection or policy stat-
ute, to an award of attorneys' fees is the long range goal to be 
pursued,206 the following two proposals must receive the highest 
priority. The federal sovereign immunity bar embodied in § 2412 of 
the Judicial Code must be repealed or strictly limited in environ-
mental protection situations. This statute stands as a deterrent to 
numerous legitimate suits which would name the federal govern-
ment as defendant. In addition, the immediate inclusion of a fee-
shifting provision under the National Environmental Policy Act is 
essential.207 Since only the government is charged with compliaacc 
with NEPA requirements, the statute will be enforced, if at all, 
through litigation commenced by individual citizens or their repre-
sentative organizations. The absence of transfer provisions in other 
environmental legislation also deserves Congressional attention in 
order to develop a comprehensive program to encourage enforce-
ment by citizen watchdogs and to supplement government efforts 
to achieve compliance with these statutes. Until Congress enacts 
such a program, the cloud created by Alyeska will continue to hang 
over public interest environmental litigation. 
"" One commentator suggests another conclusion. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary 
Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARv. L. REV. 849, 905 (1975). Whatever administra-
tive difficulties are encountered in post litigation fee hearings stem in large part from a lack 
of standards to guide judges in computing the size of the award. This problem might be 
remedied by the establishment of guidelines similar to those established by the Criminal 
Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1970), or by promulgation of local court rules. 
Caveat: in designing the schedules, fees ought to be of sufficient size to attract skilled advo-
cates who are capable of presenting the complex and delicate issues that attend environmen-
tal disputes. 
, ... As established under the fee-shifting provisions in the clean air and water pollution 
legislation, ultimate success in the lawsuit need not be made a prerequisite to an award. 
'IH\ An omnibus provision permitting fee awards in suits brought under any environmental 
protection or policy statute would be preferable. However, divisions of jurisdiction among the 
various Congressional committees might preclude such a solution. 
211' One such bill has already been introduced and is pending in the House Committee on 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries. H.R. 7829, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
